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ARTICLE 
THE RHETORIC OF ACCOMMODATION: 
CONSIDERING THE LANGUAGE OF 
WORK-FAMILY DISCOURSE 
KIRSTEN K. DAVIS* 
I wish to begin with the basic point that as human beings we 
perpetually imagine and reimagine the world and reflect what we 
imagine in the ways we talk. 
-James Boyd White l 
Law is more than a set of rules, institutions and processes; it is also a 
means of constituting community through a "common language [that de-
scribes a] common past, present, and future:'2 Stated another way, the 
words of cases, statutes and regulations "verbal[ize] and rational[ize] , , , 
acts, attitudes, and polices," and "coach[ ] , , , attitude[s]" by "deliberately 
inventing new abstractions" that draw upon already circulating legal ab-
stractions,3 Those legal abstractions make up a "weighted vocabulary" 
'" Associate Professor of Law and Director of Legal Research and Writing. Stetson Univer-
sity College of Law. Thanks to Professor Elizabeth R. Schiltz and the members of the University 
of St. Thomas Law Journal for organizing a wonderful symposium and to Stetson University 
College of Law and Sandra Day O'Connor Collcge of Law at Arizona State University for sup-
porting this work. Special thanks to Chris and Casey Reich and Carol Davis for their generous 
gifts of the family kind. 
I. James Boyd White, Imagining the Law, in THE RHETORIC OF LAW 29. 29 (Austin Sarat & 
Thomas R. Keams eds .. 1994). See also JAMES BOYD WHITE. HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE 
RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW 36 (1985) (stating that law is "a way of talking about real 
events and actual people in the world"), 
2. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow. supra note 1, at 28-29, 33, 38. See also Joan C. Williams & 
Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers who are Discriminated 
Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 77, 113 (2003) (noting that "[t]heorists have long 
recognized that law serves an expressive function and is constitutive of who we are"). 
3. KENNETH BURKE, AITITUDES TOWARD HISTORY 254, 291, 322 (3d ed., U. of Cal. Press 
1984) (1937) (describing the law as "the efficient codification of custom"). See also KENNETH 
BURKE, PERMA1\IENCE AND CHANGE: AN ANATOMY OF PURPOSE 187 n.2 (3d ed., U. of Cal. Press 
1984) (1954) (describing the law as "an implement for the molding of custom"). Notably. law is 
what Burke calls "secular prayer," which he defines as "the coaching of all attitude by the use of 
mimetic and verbal language." BURKE, ATTITUDES TOWARD HISTORY, supra at 322. According to 
Burke, law is a resource to be "cashed in on" to invent new abstractions by analogy to existing 
abstractions. and legal language" 'takers] up the slack,' between what is desired and what is got 
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2007] THE RHETORIC OF ACCOMMODATION 531 
speech that is "loaded with judgments" and composed not only of "words 
alone, but [also of] the social textures, the local psychoses, and the institu-
tional structures {whose] purposes and practices ... lie behind these 
words."4 This vocabulary forms a "terministic screen," which is a filter of 
experience that not only "singl[es] out or highlight[s] certain aspects (of 
experience] for focused attention," but also makes invisible other aspects.5 
As such, the vocabulary that makes up the terministic screen both "en-
able! sl . . . observations" and "sets limits on what observations are 
possible. "6 
Work-family discourse in the law is a terministic screen that filters the 
experience of work and family. This discourse orients its participants to 
particular ways of thinking about the interconnectedness and segmentation 
of work and family, the conflicts between these realms,7 and the ways in 
which individuals navigate boundaries8 between the two. The language of 
courts, legislators and regulators reflects and highlights certain realities 
about what is possible for work and family and, at the same time, deflects 
and makes invisible other work-family realities. 
As a starting point for examining the terministic screen of work-family 
discourse in the law, the word "accommodate" might be considered. "Ac-
commodate," the verb, and "accommodation," the noun,9 are words that are 
sometimes used in describing how to improve the relationship between 
work and family by pursuing "workplace restructuring lO to accommodate 
family life," as the title of this symposium suggests. In this context, "ac-
commodate" has been associated with a legal duty of employers to engage 
in affirmative behaviors that allow employees who are caregivers to "par-
... by ... introduc[ing] ... legal fictions and judicial 'interpretations' that ... bridge the gap 
betwccn principle and reality." Id. at 291. 
4. BURKE, PERMANENCE AND CHANGE, supra note 3, at 182. 
5. DAVID BLAKESLEY, TIll! ELEMENTS OF DRAMATISM 95 (2002). 
6. Id.; see also KENNETH BURKE, A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES 59 (U. of Cal. Press 1969) 
(1945) ("Men seek vocabularies that will be faithful reflections of reality. To this end, they must 
develop vocabularies that are selections of reality. And any selection of reality must, in certain 
circumstances, function as a deflection of reality."). 
7. For a discussion of theories about the mechanisms for linking work and family, including 
interconnection, segmentation, and conflict, see Jeffrey R. Edwards & Nancy P. Rothbard, Mecha-
nisms Linking Work and Family: Clarifying the Relationships Between Work and Family Con-
structs, 25 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 178 (2000). 
8. For a discussion of the relationship between work and family as "role transition" or 
"boundary-crossing," see Blake E. Ashforth, Glen E. Kreiner, & Mel Fugate, All in a Day's Work: 
Boundaries and Micro Role Transitions, 25 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 472 (2000). 
9. "Accommodate" and "accommodation" will be used interchangeably throughout this 
article. 
10. Compare Naomi Cahn & Michael Seimi, The Class Ceiling, 65 MD. L. REV. 435, 457 
(2006) (encouraging work-family scholars to do more than "concentrat[e] ... efforts on restructur-
ing the workplace"), with Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: Restructuring the Workplace, 32 
ARIZ. L. REV. 431, 431 (1990) (arguing that "[n]othing less than a restructuring of the workplace 
is necessary" to resolve the conflict between work and family). 
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ticipate fully in market work."!! While some have promoted policies that 
"accommodate" family life in the workplace,!2 others have criticized "ac-
commodation" as insufficient to capture the most beneficial ways for think-
ing about the overlapping experiences of work and family.u 
"Accommodate" is not only used in discussing the relationship be-
tween work and family and what legal approaches are necessary for im-
proving that relationship. Rather, "accommodate" is a term also used in 
other areas of legal discourse and, as a result, is a "weighted" term that 
carries with it the rhetorical baggage of its use in those contexts. Exploring 
existing legal uses of "accommodate," then, can help to make sense of how 
meaning is "drawn from"14 those contexts, is transferred into new conversa-
tions about work and family, and affects thinking about work-family 
policies. 
In thinking about how to engage in legal talk about work and family 
and how to craft future policies that affect work-family issues, it is impor-
tant to ask questions that reveal the rhetoric of "accommodation" in cur-
rently circulating legal texts. In other words, how does accommodation's 
multiple uses in the law shape the meaning of the term before it is even 
uttered in the discussion of work-family law and policies? What images, 
ideas and meanings are evoked when work-family policies seek "accommo-
dation" of family in the workplace? And, can other terms be substituted for, 
or used in conjunction with, "accommodate" that will alter the "terministic 
screen" for talking about and experiencing work and family? 
This article proposes that "accommodation" has multiple express and 
implied meanings and associations arising from its use in legal texts, partic-
ularly in those texts that address employer and employee relationships. As a 
result, using "accommodation" to talk about policies for workplace restruc-
turing sends particular but sometimes conflicting messages about how to 
I L Rachel Arnow-Richman, Accommodation Subverted: The Future of Work/Family Initia-
tives in a "Me, Inc." World, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 345, 347 (2000). 
12. See, e.g., Peggie R. Smith, Accommodating Routine Parental Obligations in an Era of 
Work-Family Conflict: Lessons from Religious Accommodations, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 1443 (assert-
ing that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act's religious accommodation provision offers a workable 
model for accommodating workers' family demands); see also Debbie N. Kaminer, The Work-
Family Conflict: Developing a Model of Parental Accommodation in the Workplace, 54 AM. U. L. 
REV. 305 (2004); cf Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law 
Women's Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of the Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 371 (2001) (arguing for the Americans with Disabilities Act as the model for 
work-family accommodation policies). 
13. See Arnow-Richman, supra note II, at 345,349 (writing about the "limitations of man-
dated accommodation as a unitary strategy for redressing workplace disadvantage attributable to 
caregiving"); Williams & Segal, supra note 2, at 80 (criticizing the use of an accommodation 
model for work-family policy proposals). 
14. BURKE, PERMANENCE AND CHANGE, supra note 3, at 104 (HAbstraction means literally a 
'drawing from.' Whenever a similar strain can be discerned in dissimilar events ('drawn from' 
them) we can classify the events together on the basis of this common abstraction. And the partic-
ular strains which we select as significant depend upon the nature of our interests."). 
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improve the relationships between employers and employees concerning 
work-family issues, and may impose certain limits for thinking about how 
employees can successfully enact their work and family roles. This article 
suggests that other terms for expressing the relationship between employers 
and employees can reflect different ideas for workplace restructuring and 
expand the possibilities for policies to help employees and employers man-
age the intersection between work and family life. IS 
The article heeds the exhortation that studies of work-family issues 
must do more than employ traditional legal analysis in exploring the pos-
sibilities for restructuring the workplace. 16 Accordingly, the article employs 
Kenneth Burke's "cluster" method of rhetorical criticism to explore the 
contingencies, hidden meanings and paradoxes of the words "accommo-
date" and "accommodation" as they are used in four areas of legal dis-
course. Cluster analysis is useful for understanding these words as used in 
the work-family context because cluster analysis gets at our "schema[s] for 
orientation"17 about "accommodation" by asking what "goes with," is im-
plied by, and follows from the use of "accommodation" in a text. 18 
Using these inquiries as guides for investigation, this article first exam-
ines some notable legal sources for the meaning of "accommodate." The 
article then examines how these meanings may affect how we understand 
"accommodate" when it is used in work-family discourse. Finally, the arti-
cle offers "facilitation" and "negotiation" as possible alternative or addi-
tional terms for talking about the relationship between employees and 
employers and restructuring the workplace for family obligations. The arti-
cle concludes that although "negotiation" and "facilitation" presume a par-
ity between employee and employer not required by "accommodation," the 
terms open up the possibility of envisioning workplace restructuring as a 
process simultaneously enacted by both employee and employer, where 
both share responsibility for and commitment to the restructured environ-
ment. Moreover, the terms imply good faith interaction between employees 
and employers and provide a vehicle for thinking about work and family as 
constituents of individual identity rather than as conflicting spheres to be 
managed. 19 
15. This article does not directly address using theories of discrimination under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act to remedy mistreatment of caregivers in the workplace. See, e.g., Williams & 
Segal, supra note 2, at 116 (describing "discrimination language" as helping to "define work-
family conflict as a structural problem that demands structural solutions"). This author acknowl-
edges that "discrimination" can be another terministic screen for understanding work-family 
issues. 
16. See Dowd, supra note 10, at 43 L 
17. BURKE, PERMANENCE A?-lD CHANGE, supra note 3, at 76. 
18. BLAKESLEY, supra note 5, at 196. 
19. Erica L. Kirby, Stacey M. Weiland, & Chad McBride, Work/Life Conflict, in THE SAGE 
HANDBOOK OF CONFLI= COMMUNICATION: INTEGRATING THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 342 
(John G. Detzel & Stella Ting-Toomey eds., 2006) (discussing role and identity management in 
the context of work-family issues). 
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The goal of this article is not to answer the question of what policies to 
pursue to restructure the workplace. Further, this article does not seek to set 
out a definitive meaning of any term or to suggest foreclosing the use of 
any particular term in the pursuit of workplace restructuring. Instead, the 
article considers how using "accommodate" as a key term in policy discus-
sions affects ways of envisioning the roles, relationships and possibilities 
for work and family. Ideally, this article will not discourage pursuing multi-
ple avenues for improving the relationship between work and family, but 
rather will encourage careful thinking about language choices in the pursuit. 
I. "ACCOMMODATION" IN THE LAW-CONFLICTING RHETORICS 
"Accommodation" derives meaning-explicitly and implicitly-from 
four noteworthy legal uses.20 The first three meanings of accommodation 
emanate from statutory provisions that impose obligations upon an em-
ployer to accommodate certain employee characteristics or activities. Two 
of these statutes have been used as models for accommodating families in 
the workplace;21 the third statute expressly addresses the relationship be-
tween work and family. First, "accommodation" is used in the Americans 
with Disabilities Act22 to describe the duty of an employer to adapt a work-
place to provide "reasonable accommodations" to workers with disabilities 
who are otherwise qualified for employment,23 Second, the word is used in 
connection with the "religious accommodation" requirement of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, which requires employers to make "reasonable accom-
modations" for employees to engage in religious observances or practices.24 
Third, the Family and Medical Leave Act25 requires employers to accom-
modate the medical and family needs of employees by giving up to twelve 
weeks of unpaid leave for specific medical problems and child care needs.26 
A fourth way "accommodation" is used in the law is to describe a 
place or location, as in the phrase "public accommodation." For example, 
this phrase is used in both the Civil Rights Act of 196427 and the Americans 
with Disabilities Ace8 to describe certain kinds of locations (other than 
places of employment) where discrimination is prohibited. 
20. There may be. of course, other contexts in which the term is used that may deserve 
exploration and could increase understanding of the meaning of "accommodation." 
21. "Theorists typically conceptualize the needs of family caregivers within the framework 
of 'accommodation!.]' ... [which] is drawn from the Americans with Disabilities Act and Title 
VII's provision requiring accommodation of religion." Williams & Segal, supra note 2, at 79-80. 
22. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000). 
23. 42 U.S.c. §§ 12111, 12112(b)(5)(A). 
24. 42 U.S.c. § 2000eG). 
25. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.c. §§ 2601-2654 (2000). 
26. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). 
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b). 
28. 42 U.S.c. §§ 12181-12182. 
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A. "Accommodation" in the Americans with Disabilities Act 
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requires employers to 
modify working conditions to "reasonably accommodate" employees with 
disabilities who can perform the essential functions of the job29 if the em-
ployer does not incur "significant difficulty or expense" (i.e. an "undue 
hardship"?O in making these changes. The United States Supreme Court 
has said that "accommodation" means that an employer may treat "an em-
ployee with a disability differently, i.e., preferentially," and that preferential 
treatment is not in and of itself "unreasonable.,,31 The ADA does not, how-
ever, define "reasonable accommodation";32 rather, the ADA offers a list of 
examples of accommodations that would meet the reasonableness standard. 
Examples of "accommodation" include "job restructuring, part-time or 
modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or 
modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifica-
tions of examinations, training materials or policies, [or] the provision of 
qualified readers or interpreters ... .'>33 Generally, in cases where an em-
ployee alleges that an employer has failed to make reasonable accommoda-
tions for an employee's disability, the burden of proof first rests with the 
employee to demonstrate that a requested accommodation is "reasonable."34 
If the employee can meet this burden, then the burden of proof shifts to the 
employer to show that the accommodation would pose an "undue hardship" 
for the employer.35 The statute recites a number of factors to consider in 
determining whether an employer faces an undue hardship, including "the 
nature and cost of the accommodation needed[;] ... the overall financial 
resources [of the employer;] ... [the] number of its employees[; and] the 
number, type, and location of its facilities .... "36 
In addition to its association with "preference," three characteristics of 
"accommodate" emerge from the way it is used in the ADA to describe the 
employer's requirement to modify the workplace. First, because the adjec-
29. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). 
30. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(1O)(A). 
31. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 397 (2002). 
32. See Jeffrey O. Cooper, Overcoming Barriers to Employment: The Meaning of Reasona-
ble Accommodation and Undue Hardship in the Americans with Disabilities Act, 139 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1423, 1441 (1991). 
33. 42 U.S.c. § 121 I 1(9)(B). See also, e.g., Pantazes v. Jackson, 366 F. Supp. 2d 57, 69 
(D.C. 2005) (noting that "accommodation" means that an "employer must be willing to consider 
making changes in its ordinary work rules, facilities, terms, and conditions in order to enable a 
disabled individual to work"). 
34. See JOHN J. COLEMAN, III, DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT: LAW AND LITI-
GATION § 6:2 (Thomson West 2006) ("Most courts agree that the employee first must make at 
least some showing that specific effective accommodation is possible; then, ... the employer 
[must] carr[y the] burden of showing that a reasonable accommodation would impose undue hard-
ship .... "). 
35. [d. 
36. 42 U.S.C. § l2111(1O)(B). 
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tive "reasonable" is attached to "accommodation" in the statute, the statute 
implies that without the limits imposed by the adjective "reasonable," an 
accommodation is inherently "unreasonable" or, at the very least, ambigu-
ous as to its reasonableness, even in the presence of an "undue hardship" 
standard. A case from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit demonstrates the rhetorical connection between an accommodation's 
unreasonableness and the employer's "undue hardship," as those concepts 
function to frame the meaning of "accommodation," even though they des-
ignate different burdens of proof. In E.E.O.C. v. Amego, Inc.,37 the EEOC 
sued on behalf of a terminated employee who alleged that her former em-
ployer discharged her because of her clinical depression and refused to pro-
vide the reasonable accommodation of transferring her to a different 
position.38 The First Circuit considered whether transferring the employee 
to a different position was a reasonable accommodation.39 In considering 
the question, the court held that transferring the employee to the new posi-
tion could not be a reasonable accommodation because "[t]here was no ac-
commodation that [the employer] could make to the [new] position that 
would not cause it undue hardship."40 The court said that making the ac-
commodation would require [the employer] to hire new staff, which was a 
cost that the small, non-profit employer could not be expected to bearY 
The analysis in the Amego case shows that the question of whether an 
accommodation is "reasonable" is inextricably tied to the question of 
whether an accommodation poses an "undue hardship." Thus, even though 
the United States Supreme Court has stated that "reasonable accommoda-
tion" is not the "simple ... mirror image" of "undue hardship,"42 the link 
between "unreasonableness" and "undue hardship" reinforces the conclu-
sion that inherent in the term "accommodation" is an uncertainty about 
whether the term, standing alone, reflects reasonableness. Arguably, given 
the way the statute has been interpreted, "unreasonableness" and "undue 
hardship" are sufficiently related such that evaluating accommodations for 
any "undue hardships" they may impose might be enough to protect an 
employer from unreasonable demands. Yet, "reasonableness" is central to 
the ADA's protections and is key in the term of art "reasonable accommo-
dation." As such, its presence suggests that accommodation is sufficiently 
vague and limitless in scope that, even with the undue hardship standard 
operating as an express limit on the kinds of accommodations that are re-
37. 110 F.3d 135 (1st Cir. 1997), 
38. !d. at 141. 
39. !d. at 147--49, 
40. Id, at 148. 
41. [d. 
42. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 400-01. 
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quired of employers under the ADA, the term "reasonable" must modify 
"accommodation" to convey its acceptability as a legal requirement.43 
A second meaning implied by the use of "accommodation" in the 
ADA is that accommodations are acts that help employees, who might not 
otherwise be able to conform to the demands of the workplace, "fit" into the 
existing norms of worker productivity. This connotation originates from the 
expectation in the statute that individuals are entitled to "reasonable accom-
modations" only if they can perform the "essential functions" of the job.44 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit demonstrated the 
link between accommodation and the maintenance of employee conformity 
with marketplace norms when it held that an employer is not required to 
sacrifice productivity in order to fit an employee into a particular job, even 
if the existing "norms of productivity" have been recently changed.45 
In Milton v. Scrivner, two employees who could not meet the new 
production standards required for grocery selectors at their employer's gro-
cery warehouse claimed discrimination under the ADA.46 The court found 
that it was reasonable for the employer to increase the production standards 
to "improve [its] competitiveness in the marketplace."47 Accordingly, be-
cause "[t]he changes were aimed at increasing efficiency and productivity 
... in order to increase profit," the court found the increase was "not an 
impermissible action under the ADA," and the employer was not required 
to accommodate employees who could not meet the new productivity 
requirements.48 
The metaphor of a puzzle comes to mind when considering the con-
nection between "accommodation" and productivity norms. The workplace 
is a puzzle and the workers are some of the pieces; if a piece does not quite 
fit, the employer must alter the puzzle just enough so that the piece will fit. 
If the puzzle requires too much alteration, however, such that the puzzle 
becomes unrecognizable as the traditional workplace, then accommodation 
is not required. Accordingly, "accommodation" as used in the ADA reflects 
an expectation of employee nonconformity but requires the employer to go 
only so far to adapt the workplace to that nonconformity. 
Finally, "accommodation" as used in the ADA suggests that accom-
modations follow from, and rely exclusively upon, the duty of an employer 
43. At least one author asserts that, absent other limitations, "the duty to accommodate would 
be virtually boundless, limited only by the disabled individual's imagination." Cooper, supra note 
32, at 1441. Cooper, however, does not find that limitation in the word "reasonable." Rather, he 
identifies the "essential functions" and "undue hardship" language as limits on the duty to accom-
modate. Jd. at 1442. 
44. 42 U.S.c. § 12111(8). 
45. Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118 (10th CiL 1995). 
46. /d. at 1120. 
47. 1£1. at 1124. 
48. ld.; see also Arnow-Richman, supra note 11, at 364-67 (discussing cases where the 
norms of work are the basis for denying an accommodation). 
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to take some kind of action. The ADA places the responsibility of making 
accommodations on the employer.49 The statute defines a "covered entity" 
as "an employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-
management committee,"5o and then assigns liability for discrimination to 
that covered entity if it fails to make a reasonable accommodation for an 
otherwise qualified employee. 5 I Allocating responsibility to the employer 
under the ADA is not unexpected, however, because the employer is often 
in the best position to control the workplace and make arrangements to 
adapt that setting to the needs of an employee with disabilities. 
In sum, the ADA's use of "accommodation" associates the word with 
preference; with the inherent potential for unreasonableness; with adapting 
the workplace to "fit" a nonconforming employee into the workplace with-
out changing its essential productivity norms; and with employer duty, re-
sponsibility and controL 
B. "Accommodation" in the Religious Accommodation Provisions of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from discriminating 
against employees on the basis of religion52 and requires employers to "rea-
sonably accommodate" employees' religious activities unless providing the 
accommodation would impose an "undue hardship on the conduct of the 
employer's business."53 The language of the Civil Rights Act demonstrates 
that it shares the ADA's connection of "accommodation" to "reasonable-
ness" and employer responsibility.54 What is particularly important about 
the use of "accommodation" in the context of religious activities, however, 
is found first in the different level of burden it associates with making an 
accommodation and, second, in the distinction it highlights between accom-
modating an employee to "fit" into the workplace and accommodating an 
employee to be "separate" from the workplace. 
An employer's burden of accommodation under the Civil Rights Act is 
notably different from that under the ADA. The ADA requires an employer 
to make accommodations that do not require "significant difficulty or ex-
pense."55 The burden upon employers to accommodate employee religious 
practices has been interpreted as much lower, however; employers need 
only accommodate employees' religious practices if the burden on the em-
49. See, e.g., Wade v. DaimJerChrysler Corp., 418 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1050 m.D. Wis. 2006) 
(describing "accommodation" as "some concretc, specific action taken by an cmployer that en-
ables a disabled person to pcrform the essential functions of his position"). 
50. 42 C.S.C. § 12111(2). 
51. 42 U.S.C. § I 2112(b)(5)(A). 
52. 42 C.S.c. § 2000e-2(a). 
53. 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe(j). 
54. See discussion supra Section I.A. 
55. 42 U.S.c. § 12JJI(l0)(A). 
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ployer in operating its business is "de minimis."56 The de minimis threshold 
has been exceeded in situations where the employer would have to bear 
costs imposed by an employee's absence from the workplace, such as when 
"the employer would have to make do without the religious employee, 
where accommodation would involve the complex shuffling of employees, 
... where accommodation would cause a decrease in employee productiv-
ity, and where the employer would have to incur the cost of a replacement 
employee."57 
Contrasting the Civil Rights Act de minimis standard with the ADA's 
"significant difficulty or expense" language shows that "accommodation," 
used in the abstract, can invoke conflicting ideas about the degree of effort 
required to accommodate depending on the kind of accommodation that is 
requested. On one hand, the ADA suggests that if an employee wants to 
"fit" into the workplace and its existing norms of productivity, an employer 
should bear a burden up to a "significant difficulty or expense" in making 
that happen,58 On the other hand, the Civil Rights Act suggests that if work-
ers-who are already physically present and sufficiently productive in the 
workplace-seek an accommodation under the Civil Rights Act as a means 
to separate from the constraints of the workplace to engage in religious 
practices, the costs to employers should be only de minimis. The conflict 
about the degree to which an employer should incur costs in providing ac-
commodation59 based on whether it helps employees separate60 from the 
workplace or integrate into it can create ambiguity in what "accommoda-
tion" might require as it is used in other contexts. 
56. Trans World Airline, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (holding that to require an 
employer bear more tban a de minimis cost to provide an employee days off from work for 
religious practices is an undue hardship); see also Kaminer, supra note 12, at 355-56 (providing 
an overview of the de minimis standard). 
57. Kaminer, supra note 12, at 355-56 (footnotes omitted). 
58. Arnow-Richman opines, however, that "most accommodations provided under the statute 
tend to be modest and relatively inexpensive." Arnow-Richman, supra note II, at 364 (footnote 
omitted). 
59. See Smith, supra note 12, at 1479-80 (recognizing the contrasting interpretations). 
60. Religious discrimination claims under Title VII are not limited to situations where an 
employee is denied time away from work or altered work schedules for religious practices. Other 
situations include, for where an employee refuses to wear clothing or jewelry required 
by the employer, Kreilkamp v. Roundy's, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 2d 903 (W.D. Wis. 2006) (employee 
refusing to wear holiday necklace), or where an employee does not comply with workplace 
"grooming requirements, Brown v. F.L. Roberts & Co., Inc., 419 F. Supp, 2d 7 (D. Mass. 2006) 
(employee refusing to shave and cut hair on religious grounds). It is possible to also characterize 
those situations as ones where employees assert a kind of "separateness" (i.e., a separateness in 
"norms" of workplace appearance) that demand a lesser standard of employer burden. The idea 
generally is that when an employee privileges those actions or characteristies deemed "private," 
rather than associated with market work, the employer need incur only a minimal burden as a 
result. 
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C. "Accommodation" and The Family and Medical Leave Act 
The Family and Medical Leave Act61 (FMLA) directly addresses the rela-
tionship between employers and employees with respect to the management 
of work and family. The FMLA requires employers to permit certain quali-
fied workers to take unpaid leaves of absence from work for expressly de-
fined health problems and child care obligations.62 Unlike in the ADA and 
Civil Rights Act, the words "accommodation" or "accommodate" are not 
routinely used as terms of art in the statute and regulations or when discuss-
ing the FMLA.63 The act, however, gives meaning to "accommodate" in 
four ways. 
First, the FMLA expressly positions the expectations of employers 
against the needs of workers with respect to accommodation. The "Find-
ings" section of the FMLA explains that the statute was necessary because 
there was "[a] lack of employment policies to accommodate working par-
ents" that could "force individuals to choose between job security and 
parenting."64 In contrast, the "Purposes" section of the FMLA recognizes 
that permitting employees to take "reasonable [medical and child care] 
leave" must be done "in a manner that accommodates the legitimate inter-
ests of employers,"65 which, according to the Code of Federal Regulations, 
are in "high-performance organizations."66 Thus, the FMLA can be viewed 
as the means by which Congress intended to simultaneously "accommo-
date" the "legitimate interests" of employers in "high-performance" work-
places and the needs of employees in meeting both work and family 
obligations.67 
Second, the FMLA implies that its statutory accommodations are for 
family crises rather than family routines.68 The stated purpose of the FMLA 
61. 29 U.S.C. § 260l. 
62. 29 U.S.c. §§ 2611-2612. 
63. The word "accommodate" is used in the "Findings and Purposes" sections of the FMLA, 
as discussed infra, and is also used in the FMLA's language that pennits an employer to assign an 
employee to an "available alternative position" when that position would "better accommodate" 
intermittent leave schedules. 29 U.S.c. § 2612(b)(2)(B). See also, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 825.117 
(2007); 29 C.F.R § 825.215 (2007) (stating that the "FMLA does not prohibit an employer from 
accommodating an employee's request to be restored to a different shift, schedule, or position 
which better suits the employee's personal needs on return from leave ... "). 
64. 29 U.S.C. § 260l(a)(3). 
65. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2)-(3). 
66. 29 C.F.R § 825.l01(b). 
67. See also Arnow-Richman, supra note 11, at 357 (stating that the FMLA provides a "fixed 
accommodation . .. to employees with particular family caregiving responsibilities") (emphasis 
added). 
68. See Lisa Bomstein, Inclusions and Exclusions in Work-Family Policy: The Public Values 
and Moral Code Embedded in the Family and Medical Leave Act, \0 COLUM. I. GENDER & L. 77, 
124 (2000) (noting that the Act "provides leave only in crisis situations"). Legal scholars have 
also recognized that the FMLA is based on a medical model; that is, the FMLA limits the 
worker's legally cognizable role as a family member to one who deals with serious, intennittent 
family medical issues rather than one who handles the routine issues of caregiving. See, e.g., 
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is to reassure employees "that they will not be asked to choose between 
continuing their employment and meeting their personal and family obliga-
tions" when "a family emergency arises."69 As such, the FMLA reaches 
only "serious health conditions" of an employee or a statutorily defined 
family member that require "inpatient care in a [medical facility]" or "con-
tinuing treatment by a health care provider."70 The Department of Labor 
defines "continuing treatment" as that which involves, among other things, 
incapacity of "more than three consecutive calendar days" or any period of 
incapacity that results from a "chronic serious health condition."71 Thus, the 
FMLA does not cover short-term, common, acute illnesses, such as a cold 
or the flu, that require the worker to be away from work for a day or two at 
a time,72 and it does not provide a worker-parent with unpaid leave for the 
minor childhood illnesses that routinely require a parent to stay home with a 
sick child for a day or twO.73 Moreover, although the FMLA leave is per-
mitted for the birth or adoption of a child, that twelve weeks of leave must 
be taken within the first twelve months following birth or adoption.74 This 
limitation suggests that the critical demands upon a worker of having a new 
child in the family is time-limited; the routine demands imposed upon a 
family member by a child, such as school conferences, doctor's appoint-
ments, or vacations and holidays where child care is unavailable, are not 
recognized by the FMLA.75 
Third, the content of the FMLA's requirements suggests that accom-
modating family life in the workplace means maintaining a distinct bound-
ary between work and family; it provides detailed language describing the 
role of employers and employees in navigating that boundary when neces-
Maxine Eichner, Square Peg in a Round Hole: Parenting Policies and Liberal Theory, 59 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 133 (1998). 
69. 29 C.F.R. § 825.101 (b). 
70. 29 L.S.C. § 2611(11). 
71. 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2). 
72. See 29 C.P.R. § 825.114(c) (stating that "[o]rdinarily, unless complications arise, the 
common cold, the flu, ear aches, upset stomach, minor ulcers, [and] headaches other than migraine 
... do not qualify for FMLA leave"). 
73. For example, many child care facilities and schools prohibit a child from returoing to 
school or daycare until the child has been fever-free for twenty-four hours. A child who has had a 
mild cold with a fever, for example, likely will be required (if the parents and the child care 
facility or school are following the rules) to stay home one additional day after the fever passes. 
Thus, minor childhood illnesses can require a parent to find alternative care for a child for at least 
two days. Multiplying these days by multiple sicknesses and multiple children can significantly 
increase the amount of time a worker could need to be absent frum work to attend to a sick child, 
even though those illnesses are not considered "serious." 
74. 29 L.S.c. § 2612(2). 
75. State statutory schemes have attempted to partially fill the gap left by the FMLA. See, 
e.g., 149 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 52D (2007) (providing twenty-four hours of leave for 
worker to attend child's school activities or doctor's appointments); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.159 
(2005) (requiring employers to provide leave to employees to "care for a child of the employees 
who is suffering from an illness, injury or condition that is not a serious health condition but that 
requires home care"). 
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sary. Under the FMLA, an employer accommodates an employee's "separa-
tion" from the workplace for medical and child care crises by providing a 
leave of absence and then subsequently "fitting" the employee back into the 
workplace when the crisis has ended. As in the ADA and the religious ac-
commodation provisions of the Civil Rights Act, the degree of burden re-
quired by the employer in providing accommodation is connected to 
whether the employee is physically separated from work or seeking contin-
ued access to it. 
An employer is required to give only unpaid leave to accommodate an 
employee when she "separates" from work to attend to family life.76 When 
the employee wants to come back to work, however, the FMLA requires the 
employer to take more significant steps to "fit" the worker back into the 
workplace. In most cases, the FMLA requires 'the employer to restore the 
employee to the same position as before the FMLA leave or to another 
position with equivalent "benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions."77 
This is true even if the employer replaced the employee or restructured the 
workplace to deal with the employee's absence.78 Moreover, an employer 
may be required to continue to pay other benefit premiums while the em-
ployee is on leave to ensure that the employee will have those same benefits 
on return.19 The employer, then, faces a potentially greater administrative or 
economic burden to accommodate the return of the employee to the work-
place because the demands are more onerous than simply providing unpaid 
leave. 
Finally, discussions surrounding the FMLA reinforce the idea that "ac-
commodation," standing alone, carries with it a potential for "unreasonable-
ness" that must be addressed by imposing strict limits on what actions of 
accommodation are statutorily required. Public discussions about the 
FMLA reveal concerns that employees abuse the FMLA.80 The Wage and 
Hour Division of the Department of Labor recently requested public com-
ments on the FMLA, noting that "[e]mployers contend that one of the unin-
76. 29 U.S.CO § 26l2(c). An additional requirement is that the employee's "group health 
plan" coverage must be continued during the unpaid leave. 29 U.S.C. § 26l4(c)(l). If, however, 
an employee fails to return from unpaid leave in certain circumstances, the employer can "recover 
the premium that the employer paid for maintaining [the employee's] coverage" during the leave, 
29 U.S.CO § 26l4(c)(2). thereby rcducing the employer's cost if the employee does not return to 
the workplace. 
77. 29U.S.C. § 26l4(a)(l). One commentator notes that the legislative history of the FMLA 
characterizes the "equivalency" standard a "stringent" one. THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE 
ACT 256 (Michael J. Ossip & Robert M. Hale eds., 2006). 
78. 29 C.F.R. § 825.214(a) (2007); but see Kaminer, supra note 12, at 355-56 (describing 
the development of case law under the Civil Rights Act that expressly establishes that employers 
are not expected to bear these burdens in accommodating religious practices). 
79. See THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT, supra note 77, at 256. 
80. E.g., Molly Sevin, Family Leave Act Being Reviewed: Businesses' Complaints That 
Workers Abuse the Law Prompt the U.S. to Seek Public Comment, L.A. TIMES.COM, Feb. 6. 2007 
(noting that "managers say [that] workers' abuse of the law causes scheduling nightmares. lost 
productivity and often escalates into costly lawsuits"). 
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tended consequences of the FMLA regulations has been that employers 
have little recourse to prevent those employees who take FMLA leave im-
properly from doing so .... "81 In the same request for information, the 
Department of Labor asked for commentary on the minimum days of inca-
pacity required for a "serious medical condition" and on whether "intermit-
tent leave" for things like chronic health conditions is overly burdensome 
on employers.82 Some organizations support regulatory changes that would 
increase the number of days of incapacity for an illness to qualify for leave 
under the FMLA and would restrict the ability to take intermittent leave. 83 
These criticisms and potential changes to the FMLA reinforce the idea 
that "accommodation" is seen as reasonable and manageable only when, 
paradoxically, an employee faces something so serious that the employee 
must separate from the workplace for a lengthy time. Conversely, the con-
cerns voiced about the FMLA's requirements that employees be given in-
termittent leave for chronic conditions show that "accommodation" may be 
associated with unreasonableness when it is linked with the more frequent 
concerns or more mundane events of an employee's family life. Adding this 
to the FMLA's stated purpose that it seeks to accommodate the needs of 
workers in their family lives demonstrates that the FMLA envisions accom-
modations as reasonable when they are for family events that are extraordi-
nary but not routine. 
In sum, although "accommodate" is not used as a term of art in the 
FMLA, it still obtains much of its legal meaning from the ways in which the 
FMLA implicitly defines the term. The FMLA envisions accommodations 
for work and family as demanding recognition not only of the employee's 
family needs but also of the employer's interest in "high performing" orga-
nizations. As part of this overt recognition of the employer's needs, the 
FMLA implicitly limits the meaning of the phrase "family life" to crisis 
situations and downplays the demands of routine family matters. The 
FMLA also treats family and work as mutually exclusive realms and places 
different burdens of accommodation on the employer depending on whether 
the employee is separating from or re-entering the workplace. Finally, the 
FMLA associates accommodation with potential unreasonableness resulting 
from workplace adjustments to address routine family issues. 
D. Public "Accommodation" Under the ADA and the Civil Rights Act 
A final area for interrogating the meaning of "accommodation" that may 
not be immediately obvious, but is significant, is where the term is used to 
describe a "place" where certain types of discrimination are prohibited. In 
81. Request for Information on the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 71 Fed. Reg. 
69,504, at 69.507 (Dec. 1,2006). 
82. Id. 
83. See, e.g., Sevin, supra note 80. 
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particular, the ADA and the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibit dis-
crimination in places of "public accommodation."84 When "accommoda-
tion" as a term is associated with a place, it invokes meanings that are not 
traditionally associated with the employer-employee relationship. 
First, "accommodation" as place in the ADA and Civil Rights Act im-
plies a host-guest relationship between the party providing the accommoda-
tion, the host, and the party invited to use the accommodation, the guest. 
The ADA includes in the definition of "public accommodation" private en-
tities that "serv[e] food or drink,"85 provide "exhibition or entertainment,"86 
provide a "place of public gathering,"87 act as a "service" or "social ser-
vice" establishment,88 or provide "a place of exercise or recreation. "89 The 
Civil Rights Act includes similar entities and further mentions that "public 
accommodations" include establishments that "serv[ e] patrons. "90 
The Civil Rights Act and the ADA require a public accommodations 
provider to make available without discrimination the "goods, services, fa-
cilities, privileges, [and] advantages" at the place of public accommoda-
tion.91 Imposing this duty upon the public accommodation provider makes 
sense under the circumstances; there is little, if any, authority that an indi-
vidual, acting as a guest or patron, can exercise over the kinds of places 
described in the statutes, including, for example, inns, restaurants, theaters, 
stadiums, parks, train stations, libraries or day care centers.92 
Second, not only does the term "accommodation" as place invoke 
ideas of service and patronage, it includes locations that are used for activi-
ties of relaxation, pleasure and entertainment. The Civil Rights Act gener-
ally categorizes public accommodations as "inn[s]"-places to sleep; 
"restaurant[s],,-places to eat; or "places of ... entertainment"93-places to 
play. Within this scheme, certain types of locations fall outside this mean-
ing of accommodation. For example, one court held that although the Civil 
Rights Act could include "health spas, golf clubs, and beach clubs," the 
84. 42 U.S.c. § l2l82(a) ("No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disa-
bility in the full and equal enjoyment of ... any place of public accommodation .... "); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000a(a) ("All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of ... any place of 
public accommodation ... without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race. color, 
religion or national origin."). 
85. 42 U.S.c. § 12181(7)(B); 42 U.S.C. 2000a(b)(2) ("selling food for consumption on the 
premises"). 
86. 42 U.S.c. § 12l8l(7)(C); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(3). 
87. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(0). 
88. 42 U.S.c. § 12181(7)(F), (K). 
89. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). 
90. 42 U.S.c. § 2000a(a)(4). 
91. 42 U.S.c. § 2000a(b); 42 U.S.c. § 12182(a) (discrimination prohibited "by any person 
who owns, leases .. or operates a place of public accommodation"). 
92. See 42 U.S.c. § 12181(7). 
93. 42 U.S.c. § 2000a(b). The AOA definition provides a more expansive list of places for 
recreation or entertainment and also includes service, sales. rental, and social service establish-
ments in its definition. 42 U.S.c. § 12181(7). 
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definition of "accommodation" under the statute was not broad enough to 
include retail stores such as barber shops because a barber shop was not a 
"place of entertainment."94 
Finally, implicit in "accommodation" as place is the idea that the guest 
is being passive or engaging in activities of diversion. One federal district 
court, for example, interpreted ''place of entertainment" under the Civil 
Rights Act to include" 'establishments [that] present shows ... to a passive 
audience. '''95 Another case defined "entertainment" under the statute as an 
"agreeable occupation for the mind; diversion; amusement .... "96 
In sum, meanings associated with "accommodation" as place invoke 
images of a host-guest relationship where the emphasis is often on relaxa-
tion, amusement and entertainment-terms not generally used in describing 
the relationship between employer and employee or in describing the work-
place. Both the ADA and the Civil Rights Act distinguish between discrimi-
nation in places of employment and places of public accommodation,97 
which further demonstrates that "accommodation," as a legal term, can 
have multiple connotations depending upon the nature of the relationship it 
mediates. 
II. ACCOMMODATION RHETORIC: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
WORK-FAMILY DISCOURSE 
As the previous sections describe, a rhetoric of "accommodation" ex-
ists from its current uses in legal discourse and provides "a set of topics, a 
set of terms ... , and some general directions as to the process of thought"98 
for discussing and ultimately implementing policies to "restructure the 
workplace to accommodate families." This section offers some thoughts on 
what topics and terms "accommodation" brings into focus for attention, 
what it hides from view, and what conflicting meanings, ambiguities, and 
processes of thought it might create when used in work-family discourse. 
"Accommodation" in the legal discourse discussed above is used in a 
way that it refers to both employee nonconformity and to an envisioned 
"ideal." For the ADA, the nonconformity at issue is a disability that re-
quires alteration of the workplace; for the Civil Rights Act, it is a religious 
94. Halton v. Great Clips, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 2d 856, 862 (N.D. Ohio 2000). Notably, the ADA 
expressly includes barber shops in its delineation of "public accommodations." 42 U.S.C. 
§12181(7)(F). 
95. United States v. L.c. Vizena, 342 F. Supp. 553, 554 (W.D. La. 1972) (quoting Miller v. 
Amusement Enters., Inc., 394 F.2d 342, 350-51 (5th Cir. 1968) (en banc». 
96. Halton, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 862. 
97. The ADA separates "public accommodation" from "employment" in its list of critical 
areas where "society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.c. 
§ 12111(a) (2000). In the Civil Rights Act, discrimination in employment and in public accommo-
dations are treated in separate subsections. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000a to 2000a-6 (public accommoda-
tions); 42 U.S.c. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (employment). 
98. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow, supra note I, at 41. 
546 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 4:3 
practice that normally would not be acknowledged in the workplace; for the 
FMLA, it is the state of having serious health conditions or new children 
that, without accommodation, might result in the employee either continu-
ing to work as "normal" or leaving the workplace permanently. In combina-
tion, these uses demonstrate that "ideal" workplaces have "ideal workers,,99 
whose work lives are not affected by disabilities, religious practices, serious 
health conditions or children unless an employer is specifically directed to 
accommodate those nonconforming traits or states in the workplace. Rachel 
Arnow-Richman posits that the ADA, for example, could envision "accom-
modation" as "job restructuring and modified work schedules," and could 
"challenge features of work rooted in the 'ideal worker' norm" but does 
not. 100 Thus, using "accommodation" to describe work-family relationships 
conjures up two competing meanings. On one hand, "accommodation" calls 
attention to the fact that traditional notions of workers, workplaces and 
workplace standards do not accurately ret1ect reality. On the other hand, 
"accommodation" perpetuates the idea that the "ideal worker" exists, and 
only through exceptions in the form of accommodations can other workers 
who are not "ideal" be included in the workplace. 
"Accommodation" also carries with it the difficulty of having multiple 
meanings regarding the kinds of activities that the word encompasses. That 
is, accommodation is expressly linked to the notion of "crisis," particularly 
in the FMLA, and it is also linked to ideas of relaxation, entertainment, 
diversion or passiveness when it is used to describe a place. Interestingly, 
what might result from these conflicting meanings is that "accommodation" 
may prove difficult to associate with the routine and mundane matters of 
everyday life. Accommodation's link to "crisis" may draw attention to the 
kinds of extraordinary (and often temporary) medical and family crises. 
Conversely, "accommodation" as relaxation and entertainment focuses on 
ways to escape from the demands of everyday life. Neither of these uses 
connote that "accommodation" should apply to the needs of employees in 
managing their routine obligations to both their families and employers. WI 
Moreover, what follows from the FMLA and the employment discrim-
ination provisions of the ADA and the Civil Rights Act is ambiguity about 
the nature of the employer's burden in a statutory scheme that requires the 
employer to accommodate family in the workplace. For both the ADA and 
Civil Rights Act, accommodations must not impose an "undue hardship"; 
99. Joan Williams describes one view of the "ideal worker" as one who "works full time and 
overtime and takes little or no time off for childbearing or child rearing." JOAN WILLIAMS, UN-
BENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT I (2000). See 
also infra note 106 (describing the ideal worker). 
100. Arnow-Richman, supra note II, at 366-67. 
101. For example, neither view of accommodation would encompass an "employee who re-
turns from FMLA leave following the birth of a child [who could use assistance] in balancing her 
job and the care of a three-month-old infant." Arnow-Richman, supra note II, at 368 (describing 
the limits of the FMLA). 
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what counts as "not undue" ranges from a burden just short of a "significant 
difficulty or expense" to no more than a de minimis burden. One perspec-
tive is that accommodations are expensive, and Joan Williams and Nancy 
Segal have argued against an accommodation model for work-family re-
structuring because the "traditional assumption [in the context of workplace 
restructuring is] that accommodation is costly."I02 Alternatively, accommo-
dations can be viewed as inexpensive, and employers making accommoda-
tions could be subject to the de minimis burden under the Civil Rights Act, 
which has been described as so insignificant that it "renders the accommo-
dation requirement virtually useless .... "103 
Given these conflicting burdens associated with accommodation, there 
exists no certainty about how policies seeking "accommodation" for family 
demands in the workplace will be interpreted. Particularly, if the kinds of 
accommodations requested include those that reflect routine family matters, 
then it is possible that the burden associated with "accommodation" would 
be closer to de minimis because a routine matter is not a crisis. Whether an 
employer should bear de minimis or significant burdens in accommodating 
family in the workplace is certainly debatable. Regardless, when using the 
word "accommodation" in the work-family debate, one is left with the 
question of which view of "accommodation" will be taken. Will the burden 
on employers be viewed as substantial or as small and insignificant? De-
pending on the way the ambiguity is resolved, what does this mean for the 
kinds of accommodations that can result? 
The shifting degree of burden placed upon an employer in making 
"reasonable accommodations" also implies that the meaning of "accommo-
dation" changes based on whether the conflict between employer and em-
ployee is resolved more in favor of the employer's interest in maintaining 
norms of productivity and high performance or more in favor of the em-
ployee's interest in dealing with family issues. Under the ADA, when per-
sonal characteristics in the form of a disability limit an otherwise qualified 
employee from performing a job, greater responsibility is placed upon the 
employer to accommodate that employee's "fit" into the workplace. Here, 
the ADA suggests that the "fit" will "necessarily reflect dominant norms 
and expectations about work,"104 which means that "accommodation" is 
seen as upholding the employer's expectations of traditional worker produc-
tivity. Conversely, under the Civil Rights Act, when religious practices in-
terfere with work obligations, an employer is expected to incur only de 
102. Williams & Segal. supra note 2. at 86. 
103. See Smith. supra note 12. at 1479 n.201 (recognizing and citing commentators that make 
this assertion). Smith also attempts to reconcile these competing meanings by suggesting that 
"accommodation" in the context of work-family policies should impose a "moderate" cost upon 
employers. ld. at 1480. This is a useful suggestion, but it does not resolve the problem of the 
mUltiple meanings associated with the cost of accommodation; instead, it adds a third meaning. 
104. Arnow-Richman, supra note 11. at 367. 
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minimis costs to privilege an employee's personal or private obligations. In 
that case, "accommodation" suggests the personal interests of the employee 
take precedence over the dominant norms about work, but only at a minimal 
cost to the employer. 
Under the FMLA, this boundary between work and family and the 
relationship between the burden and direction of movement-either into or 
out of the workplace-is even more intensely highlighted. Where the em-
ployee privileges family over work-for example, to take a leave of ab-
sence to care for a new baby-the employer has more limited obligations. 
Yet, when the employee privileges work over family obligations when re-
tuming to work, the employer has the obligation of making the employee's 
job available to her. lOS In these situations, the burden faced by the employer 
is arguably tied to whether the accommodation is viewed as consistent or 
inconsistent with the employer's interests in workplace productivity. 
"Accommodation" in the context of work-family issues also implies 
that employees' needs and legitimate employer expectations for high per-
formance are in conflict. The phrase "reasonable accommodation" in the 
ADA and Civil Rights Act suggests that an employee's request for an ac-
commodation, without limits, is unreasonable (and even abusive) or, at the 
very least, is inconsistent with the employer's goals. This concern about 
unreasonableness is further perpetuated when an employer's expectation of 
a "highly performing" workplace under the FMLA is joined with accommo-
dation's connection to entertainment, rest, passiveness and diversion in the 
context of "public accommodation." Combining these meanings suggests 
that accommodating employees' family demands could mean providing 
those things that are counter to "high performance" in the workplace, such 
as intensity, focus and assertiveness. Moreover, to the extent that routine 
matters are envisioned as something to be accommodated, the association of 
"accommodation" with "diversion" might suggest that employees are seek-
ing accommodations for those things that (regularly and perhaps unnecessa-
rily) "divert" them from workplace duties and activities. It would not be a 
stretch, then, to expect that if "accommodation" is viewed through this fil-
ter, some audiences would be inclined to view policies seeking accommo-
dations as antithetical to employers' goals. At the very least, this sense of 
"accommodation" ties directly to concerns employers have expressed with 
respect to the FMLA of employees' abusing the accommodations provided 
under the statute. 
Relatedly, "accommodation" suggests that employers, not employees, 
are exclusively responsible for and have the duty of extending "prefer-
ences" to accommodate family in the workplace. As such, using the term 
"accommodation" in work-family discussions necessarily means talking 
105. Arnow-Richman notes, however, that the judicial interpretation of the reinstatement pro-
visions has limited their scope. !d. at 369-73. 
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about extending accommodations-that is, preferential treatment-from 
work to family because the norm is that "ideal workers" should have no 
family demands that impact them in the workplace and thus need no prefer-
ential treatment. 106 In that construction, employers will be expected to take 
the lead in making those changes while employees are divested of agency in 
the process. Moreover, "accommodations" have been characterized as ac-
tions that "contradict business judgment.,,1Q7 Because "accommodations" 
are deemed to contradict business judgment, because the employer has been 
described as bearing all of the burdens for making accommodation, and 
because accommodations can be seen as "preferences," the discussion can 
then turn, as it has in the discussion surrounding the FMLA, on the need for 
protecting employers against unreasonableness, abuse and loss of "high per-
formance.',1Q8 And, where the language of "accommodation" implies that 
employers may be subjected to unreasonable demands of employees in the 
absence of express limits, it may be difficult to use the term to craft policies 
that avoid characterization as "preferences" and that reconcile an em-
ployer's good business judgment with the employee's need to effectively 
manage work-family issues.1Q9 
As is always true, more investigation might lead to finding other ways 
"accommodation" is used in legal discourse and to further interpreting the 
term in the context of policies to restructure the workplace for the benefit of 
families. The discussion above, however, attempts to demonstrate that a 
"terministic screen" has developed around the word "accommodation" as it 
is used in legal discourse that is a "selection[ 1 of reality" and simultane-
ously "a deflection of reality." 1 10 
In sum, the forgoing discussion should serve as a reminder of the 
meanings that can be conveyed when "accommodation" is used in work-
family talk. If "accommodation" is associated with "nonconformity," then 
using "accommodation" in work-family policies might convey the idea that 
workers who have family obligations are outside the norm. Requests for 
106. The "ideal" worker is an individual unencumbered by child care or other nurturing re-
sponsibilities. Kessler, supra note 12, at 430; see also Faye J. Crosby, Joan C. Williams & Monica 
Biernat, The Maternal Wall, 60(4) J. Soc. ISSUES 675, 677 (2004) ("Workplace ideals ... are still 
defined around men's bodies-since men need no time off for childbirth-and men's life patterns, 
as American women still do 70% to SO% of the child rearing."); WILLIAMS, supra note 99, at 
20-24 (discussing the dominant view that employers are entitled to ideal workers). 
107. Arnow-Richman, supra note II, at 373. 
lOS. See Bornstein, supra note 6S, at 90 (noting that "the Act's twin goals-to 'simultane-
ously preserve the integrity of the American family and promote business interests' -are inconsis-
tent and incompatible, setting up a clash between market driven policy and family values which 
results in a limited, incoherent policy") (citations omitted). 
109. For an example of a policy that does both, see Project for Attorney Retention, The Busi-
ness Case for a Balanced Hours Program for Attorneys, http://www.pardc.orglLawFirmlBusiness 
_Case.htm (noting that a business case for "balanced hours" is different from "special 
accommodation"). 
110. BURKE, A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES, supra note 6, at 59. 
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accommodation might be heard as requests for preferential treatment or to 
fulfill employees' needs for relaxation, entertainment or diversion rather 
than to meet important, but routine, family demands. Conversely, the term 
can invoke images of crisis rather than routine, thus limiting which employ-
ees' needs as family members might be accommodated. In the absence of 
the word "reasonable," a workplace restructuring policy seeking accommo-
dations might be seen as potentially unreasonable or fraught with opportu-
nities for employee abuse. Accordingly, the focus of debate might be on the 
kinds of limitations to place upon accommodations rather than on the ways 
for making the relationship between work and family most productive for 
both employers and employees. Accommodations might be seen as overly 
expensive for employers or, alternatively, as requiring employers to carry 
only a very small burden, particularly where "accommodation" means per-
mitting employees to leave work to attend to family responsibilities. Poli-
cies seeking accommodations may be deemed a demand placed upon 
employers that creates no concomitant responsibility for employees to par-
ticipate in making the relationship between work and family a workable 
one. 
III. WHAT ELSE BESIDES "ACCOMMODATION?"-ALTERNATIYE 
TERMS, DIFFERENT SCREENS 
Other than using "accommodation" as a key term in pursuing work-
place restructuring, what other terms might usefully fill the blank in the 
phrase "workplace restructuring to __ family life?" This section offers 
some preliminary thoughts on "facilitate" and "negotiate" as potential alter-
native terms for work-family dialogue. These terms can offer "an alternate 
vocabulary [ for] speaking and being" 111 that might transform both identity 
and experience in the context of work and family. 
"Facilitate" and "negotiate" are not interchangeable terms, and in some 
contexts, one term might work better than the other in describing work-
family policies. In combination, however, they suggest a collaborative, con-
sensus-building relationship between employers and employees where the 
employer assists the employee in meeting both work and family responsi-
bilities, where the employee has a voice in and shares responsibility for the 
conditions in which those obligations are met, and where the emphasis in 
successfully navigating work and family is, in part, based on assisting em-
ployees in managing their identities-not just their logistical difficulties-
as both workers and family members. Thus, alternative phrases employed in 
discussing potential workplace restructuring may be "workplace restructur-
ing to facilitate movement between work and family life" or "workplace 
11l. Sarah J. Tracy & Angela Trethewey, Fracturing the Real·Self?Fake.Self Dichotomy<-> 
Moving Toward "Crystallized" Organizational Discourses and Identities, 15(2) COMM. THEORY 
168, 170 (2005). 
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restructuring to help employees negotiate their identities as workers and 
family members." 
"Facilitate" is generally associated with making the performance of 
something easier or "lessening ... resistance."] 12 In the legal context, one 
state Administrative Procedure Act defines a "facilitator" as one who is 
"impartial," "assist[s] ... to achieve consensus," and "coordinate[s]."113 
Other statutes connect the term to "develop[ing] guidelines, policies, and 
procedures [to] allocat[e] ... available resources";] 14 to providing educa-
tion and documents, setting up schedules, and providing assistance; liS and 
to helping with understanding and communication to enable another "to 
participate as fully as possible."116 "Facilitation" has also been statutorily 
defined as "enabl[ing an individual] to ... participate ... in the decisions 
and choices that effect his or her life." I I7 Importantly, "facilitate" has not 
been interpreted as a guarantee of success in a given situation; rather, it has 
been seen as a way "to make easier, to aid, to assist." I 18 
"Negotiate" is associated with "confer[ring], bargain[ing], or dis-
cuss[ing] with the view to reach an agreement" and, with respect to space or 
location, "succeed[ing] in crossing, surmounting, or moving through."1l9 
Statutes have defined it to mean "transfer[ring] ... possession" in the tradi-
tional context of "negotiable" transactions,] 20 "confer[ring] or offer[ring] 
advice," 12 I and making a "good faith effort to reach [an] agreement [that 
will] ... be[] binding.,,122 With respect to ethics, "negotiate" has been 
associated with qualities such as truthfulness, fairness, candor, respect, 
112. See. e.g., WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY (3d ed.) (1988) (defining "facilitate" and 
"facilitation"); WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 690 (2d ed.) (2001) (defining "facilitate" as 
"to make easier or less difficult; help forward"). See also Bruno v. United States, 259 F.2d 8, 10 
(9th Cir. 1958) (citing Webster's Unabridged Dictionary for the "common and ordinary definition 
[of facilitate] as '[t]o make easy or less difficult; to free from difficulty or impedimcnt; as to 
facilitate the execution of a task"). Black's Law Dictionary defines "facilitate" solely in the con-
text of criminal offenses, stating that "facilitate" means to H[t]O make the commission of a crime 
easier." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 610 (7th ed. 1999). 
113. ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.760 (2006) (describing the role of a facilitator for rule-making). 
114. ALA. CODE § 12-15-171 (2007) (describing the duties of a children's services facilitation 
team). 
115, CAL. FAM. CODE § 10004 (2007) (describing duties of a "family law facilitator"). 
116. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1954.5 (2007) (describing the duties of a probate facilitator). 
117. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 4512(g) (2007). 
118. See In re Doe, 805 P.2d 1215, 1221 (Haw. Ct. App. 1991) (interpreting HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 571-63 (1985), which provides that a judge ean terminate parental rights only after finding that 
it was necessary to "facilitate the legal adoption of the child"). 
119, See, e.g., WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 907 (3d cd.) (1988); see also WEBSTER'S 
UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1268 (2d ed.) (2001) (defining "negotiate" as "to arrange for or bring 
about by discussion or settlement of terms"). 
120. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 7-3-201 (2007). 
12L See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. CODE § 20-281(10) (2007) (in the context of insurance dealings), 
122. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3540.I(h) (2007) (in public education employment statutes); see 
also D.C, CODE § 2-301.07 (2007) (in a procurement statute, meaning "to determine the terms and 
conditions of a contract"). 
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good faith, connection, mindfulness, harmony, and "treating the other ... as 
a person."123 
With these definitions in mind, how is it that "facilitate" and "negoti-
ate" might perform as "terministic screens" in the work-family context? As 
a starting point, using the word "facilitate" to describe the relationship be-
tween employer and employee in the work-family context places the em-
ployer in a position of responsibility for "assisting" the employee in 
managing both work and family life. This makes sense, of course, because 
the employer has power to change the structure of the workplace in a way 
that an employee does not. Yet, instead of placing the employer in the posi-
tion of guaranteeing "accommodation" of family life at work, "facilitate" 
suggests the employer's duty is one of "empowerment"-to assist employ-
ees in their own processes of successfully blending work and family-simi-
lar to the role that facilitators in other contexts play. "Facilitate" subtly 
offers that the employee and the employer are working together to develop 
a plan to allocate available resources for managing work and family, and 
the employer is helping the employee lessen resistance in the movement 
between family and work rather than giving an employee preferential treat-
ment that other employees do not receive. Thus, instead of promoting poli-
cies that "accommodate" family life in the workplace, which arguably 
suggests that the burden is exclusively on the employer to "give up" some-
thing for the benefit of the employee, policies might be recast in terms of 
"facilitating transitions" between work and family to increase the level of 
performance and productivity in both settings. 
Instead of a one-way guarantee implied by the use of "accommoda-
tion," "facilitate" offers that work-family relationships can be the result of 
"two-way" communication between workers and employers. Moreover, "fa-
cilitate" includes in its meaning the kinds of actions employers might take 
in helping employees manage work and family-educating, providing doc-
uments, scheduling, communicating-all in an effort to help employees 
with decisions and choices that affect their lives. Taking a "facilitation" 
view of work and family may promote as policy what employees and em-
ployers already often do informally-work together to come up with ar-
rangements that are beneficial to both employees and employers in pursuing 
their interests. 
Unlike the language of "accommodation" in the FMLA, which implies 
a tension between employees' family needs and employers' interest in 
"high performance organizations," using "facilitate" to describe the effort to 
manage work and family life implies that the interests of employers and 
workers can be coextensive and pursued in tandem. For example, Naomi 
Cahn and Michael Selmi use the language of "facilitation" to suggest that 
123. See generally John D. Feerick, What's Fair: Ethics for Negotiators, 18 GEO. 1. LEGAL 
Ennes 251 (2004) (discussing the writings of scholars exploring the area of negotiation ethics). 
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more work-family policies are needed to "facilitate women's commitment 
to the workplace."124 "Facilitation" can be used to describe work and family 
as complementary goals rather than as goals that require one party in the 
relationship to neglect some interests in order to advance others. In other 
words, "facilitate" can convey a sense that the work-family relationship is 
more than a "zero-sum" game where every accommodation comes at a re-
lated burden. Rather, "facilitate" reflects the reality that employers are pri-
marily in charge of workplaces but that workplace and family goals can be 
coordinated and jointly advanced. 
Similarly, work-family policies might be described as those that allow 
workers to more easily "negotiate" their identities or roles as workers and 
family members. Work-family scholars writing in the communication field 
suggest that the focus in reforming the relationship between work and fam-
ily should not be exclusively on enacting policies that address logistical 
concerns or promote the idea of "balance;,,125 rather, they assert that the 
goal of work-family scholars should be to understand how the identities of 
workers as family members are negotiated through language. 126 
Using a "negotiating identity" lens to examine work-family conflict 
can open the language for discussing work-family policies in a way that 
"accommodation," as currently constructed in legal discourse, has difficulty 
achieving. For example, "negotiating" identity requires a holistic view of 
the individual that accounts for both crisis events and routine family obliga-
tions as part of the employee's identity. In this way, a "negotiation" lens 
moves the talk away from describing the relationship between work and 
family as a process of "separating from" and "fitting into" the workplace, 
with different burdens attached to each direction of movement, towards talk 
that focuses on work and family as an integrated whole. Moreover, this lens 
moves the discussion away from the conflict between "ideal" and "noncon-
forming" workers to focus instead on putting in place mechanisms that al-
low for individualized and multiple "ideal" work-family relationships.127 
Thus, instead of framing "family" as pieces that "fit" or do not "fit" into the 
existing "work" puzzle, the term "negotiate" reorients the discussion around 
opportunities to design new puzzles with pieces that can fit together in mul-
tiple and equal1y useful ways. 
124. Cahn & Selmi, supra nOle 10, at 450 (emphasis added) (discussing the needs of working-
class women in the pursuit of balancing work and family and concluding that working-class wo-
men need policies that enable them to work more hours rather than less-including improved 
access to higher education, more public day care and longer school days). 
125. Erika L. Kirby, Annis G. Golden, Caryn E. Medved, Jane Jorgenson & Patrice M. Buz-
zanell, An Organizational Communication Challenge to the Discourse of Work and Family Re-
search: From Problematics to Empowerment, in 27 COMMUNICATION YEARBOOK 1, 16 (Pamela J. 
Kalbfleisch ed., 2003). 
126. See generally id. 
127. See Ashforth, supra note 8, at 488 (arguing that employees should be given more auton-
omy in negotiating the relationship between work and fantily life). 
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Additionally, "negotiate" suggests that the employer and employee are 
conferring about ways to effectively transition between or "move through" 
work and family life, are seeking in good faith to reach agreement on these 
issues, and intend to reach an agreement that does not allow either to fall 
short on fulfilling duties and responsibilities. 128 One work-family commen-
tator has implicitly recognized the need for a "negotiation" frame for talk-
ing about work-family issues by advocating for "collective action" to 
increase "dialogue between companies and their workforce ... [that] iden-
tif[ies], implement[s], and monitor[s)" work-family policies. 129 The empha-
sis on collective action also raises the possibility of giving employees more 
agency in the process of rethinking workplace norms. Similar to "facili-
tate," then, "negotiate" implies what "accommodation" does not-a corre-
spondence of interests, reciprocal responsibilities and an emphasis on 
communication. 
"Facilitate" and "negotiate" are not necessarily ideal terms that can 
solve all of the difficulties one might have in envisioning new ways for 
talking about work-family issues. For example, "facilitate" is linked with 
"impartiality" of the facilitator, and that connection may not accurately re-
flect the relationship between employee and employer. "Negotiate" has a 
similar problem; it suggests a relatively level playing field between em-
ployer and employee that may not actually exist in many employee-em-
ployer relationships. Yet, "facilitate" and "negotiate" are rhetorically 
powerful in the context of discussing work-family issues precisely because 
they overtly draw attention to the relationships of power in the employee-
employer relationship and the possibilities for redefining that relationship. 
"Negotiate" is particularly useful for imagining alternative relationships be-
tween employees and employers. That is, unlike "accommodation," which 
can be associated with unreasonableness and a need to impose limits to 
keep an employee from abusing an accommodation, "negotiation" carries 
with it connotations of reasonableness, consensus and good faith. Accord-
ingly, "negotiate" as a term for work-family policymaking brings with it a 
potential "code of ethics" for employer-employee dealings regarding work-
family issues-a code that might require mutual respect, honesty, candor, 
and the pursuit of harmony. Framing the relationship between employers 
and employees within a harmonizing ethic may not only provide powerful 
language to create policies that equalize the bargaining power between 
worker and employer but also combat the idea that, if given the opportunity, 
128. See. e.g .. Fargo Educ. Ass'n v. Paulsen, 239 N.W2d 842, 847 (N.D. 1976) (defining 
"negotiate in good faith" to mean that the agreement reached does not need to causc "either side 
[to] surrender ... any of its duties and responsibilities"). 
129. Arnow-Richman, supra note 11, at 409. Arnow-Richman also carefully reviews the pos-
sibilities and challenges of reinvigorating collective bargaining as a means to achieve work-family 
goals.ld. at 409-16. 
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employees abuse policies that promote better movement between work and 
family. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The law offers a language for talking about work and family. This lan-
guage shapes reality and thus calls out for examination, interpretation and 
criticism. When seeking policy changes to affect work-family relationships, 
the choice of terms can expand or limit the possibilities for action; the terms 
become the screen for seeing the problem and crafting a solution. As such, 
sensitivity to the language chosen for expressing those policies is necessary. 
The term "accommodate" is imbued with existing meanings emanating 
from legal discourse that may affect the discussion about work-family poli-
cies in both intended and unintended ways. Considering language that de-
scribes workplace restructuring as an effort to "facilitate" an improved 
relationship between work and family or to "negotiate" one's identity as 
worker and family member might help to expand the boundaries for imagin-
ing what is possible for legal and policy approaches to work and family 
issues. 
